Lockhart v. McCree: Conviction Proneness and the Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries by Byrne, Jane
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 36 
Issue 1 Fall 1986 Article 12 
1986 
Lockhart v. McCree: Conviction Proneness and the 
Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries 
Jane Byrne 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Jane Byrne, Lockhart v. McCree: Conviction Proneness and the Constitutionality of Death-Qualified Juries, 
36 Cath. U. L. Rev. 287 (1987). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol36/iss1/12 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
LOCKHART v. McCREE: CONVICTION-
PRONENESS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
DEATH-QUALIFIED
JURIES
Fundamental to the established tradition of American justice is the re-
quirement that the accused shall be tried before an impartial jury' which is
representative of a fair cross section of the community.2 Consistent with this
ideal, the courts have recognized that the impartial jury properly serves its
role in the scheme of justice when it interposes, between the state and the
defendant, the "common sense of the community."' It is therefore essential
that the procedures used to select jurors, and the composition of the jury
produced, comport with the basic guarantees of our judicial system.4
In cases involving the prospect of capital punishment, the choice between
life imprisonment and death is most often made by a jury.5 By requiring the
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI, which provides in pertinent part: "In all criminal prose-
cutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of
the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed ... 
2. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 527 (1975).
3. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 233-34 (1978).
4. See generally Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 219-22 (1965) (discussing the use of
peremptory challenges which were deemed necessary to ensure jury impartiality).
5. See generally Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 181-82 (1976). Thirty-seven states
presently have statutes authorizing the death penalty. Although a minority of states allow the
judge to determine penalty, thirty-three states authorize the jury to determine penalty or rec-
ommend penalty to the judge. See ALA. CODE § 13A-5-47 (1982 & Supp. 1986); ARK. STAT.
ANN. § 41-1301 (1977 & Supp. 1985); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.3 (West Supp. 1986); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 16-11-103 (1978 & Supp. 1985); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-46a (West 1985
& Supp. 1986); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4209 (1979 & Supp. 1984); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 921.141 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-31 (1982 & Supp. 1986); ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 38, para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1979 & Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-9
(Burns 1985 & Supp. 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.025 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1985 &
Supp. 1986); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 905.6 (West 1984); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27,
§ 413 (1982 & 1986); Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (Supp. 1986); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 565.030
(Vernon Supp. 1986); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554 (1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:5
(Supp. 1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20A-3 (1981 & Supp. 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-
2002 (1983 & Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2929.03 (Anderson 1982 & Supp. 1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.10 (West 1983 & Supp. 1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.150
(Supp. 1985); 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9711 (Purdon 1982 & Supp. 1986); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 16-3-20 (Law. Co-op. 1985 & Supp. 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 23A-27A-4 (1979);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2-203 (1982 & Supp. 1986); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.
37.071 (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-207 (1978 & Supp. 1986); VT.
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jury to determine punishment, courts assure that the criminal sanctions im-
posed in capital cases reflect contemporary community values and "stan-
dards of decency.",6 Since the procedures used to select jurors greatly affect
the composition of juries, and possibly the decisions made by these juries,
they have historically been the focus of constitutional scrutiny.7
In 1968, Witherspoon v. Illinois8 addressed the practice of "death-qualify-
ing" jurors for service in bifurcated capital trials.9 Death qualification is a
procedure by which members of a jury pool in capital cases are questioned
during voir dire regarding their beliefs about the death penalty.'0 Jurors
may be challenged for cause if they express that their views toward capital
punishment would prevent or substantially impair their ability to impartially
decide the facts and apply the law." The remaining jurors cumulatively
constitute a death-qualified jury.
Under the unitary, bifurcated jury system which is utilized in most
states,12 guilt and penalty are decided in two separate phases with a single
jury making both determinations.' 3 Hence, voir dire questioning to death-
STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2303(c) (1978 & Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (1983 &
Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 10.95.080 (Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. § 6-2-102 (1983
& Supp. 1986). See also Brief of Amici Curiae of Arizona at 3-4 & n. 1, Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No. 84-1865).
6. See Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519-20 & n.15 (1968).
7. See, e.g., id. at 519-23.
8. Id. at 510.
9. See United States v. Cornell, 25 F. Cas. 650 (C.C.D. R.I. 1820) (No. 14,868). This is
the first documented use of a death-qualified jury in a capital trial in the United States. In an
opinion by Justice Story, the circuit court permitted the exclusion of two Quakers who were
opposed to the death penalty from a capital jury. The court held that "[lt]o compel a Quaker to
sit as a juror on such cases, is to compel him to decide against his conscience, or to commit a
solemn perjury. Each of these alternatives is equally repugnant to the principles of justice and
common sense." Id. at 655.
10. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. 844, 848 (1985).
11. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21. The state may exclude all potential jurors who
unmistakably express: "(1) that they would automatically vote against the imposition of capi-
tal punishment without regard to any evidence that might be developed at the trial of the case
before them, or (2) that their attitude toward the death penalty would prevent them from
making an impartial decision as to the defendant's guilt." Id. (emphasis in original). See also
Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 45 (1980); Boulden v. Holman, 394 U.S. 478, 483-84 (1969);
Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 595-96 (1978); cf Wainwright v. Witt, 105 S. Ct. at 850-52;
Darden v. Wainwright, 106 S. Ct. 2464, 2469-71 (1986) (dispensing with the "unmistakable
clarity" standard of proof for juror bias).
12. At present, no state law requires a two-jury approach to bifurcated capital trials. Es-
sentially, the reason the unitary, bifurcated approach is most prevalent is because this system is
more efficient and less expensive than a two-jury approach. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp.
1273, 1319 (E.D. Ark. 1983); Brief of Amici Curiae for Alabama at 4, Lockhart v. McCree,
106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No. 84-1865).
13. In some states a sentencing judge will determine penalty. See generally Rector v.
State, 280 Ark. 385, 395-96, 659 S.W.2d 168, 173-74 (1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 988 (1984).
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qualify jurors for the penalty phase causes exclusion of venirepersons who
could fairly determine guilt, but who would not vote to impose death during
the penalty phase. "4 The constitutional issue which arises from this process
is whether a defendant receives a fair trial on the issue of guilt when the state
is permitted to exclude all jurors who refuse to impose capital punishment
during the later penalty phase proceeding.' 5
In Witherspoon, the Court limited the state's ability to remove jurors with
reservations about capital punishment' 6 from the penalty phase of capital
trials. 7 The Court held that by excluding a wide range of individuals, the
State of Illinois had "produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a
man to die."'" Regarding the jury's role in the guilt phase of the trial, the
Court rejected the defendant's claim that, even with the newly imposed lim-
its on exclusion, the death-qualified jury was pro-prosecution and convic-
tion-prone.19 The Court observed that social science data,2" indicating that
14. Keeten v. Garrison, 578 F. Supp. 1164, 1170 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129
(4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986).
15. Id. at 1167.
16. The group contested in Witherspoon and addressed as "all persons voicing general
objection to capital punishment" is composed of persons in categories 4, 5, and 6 below.
Witherspoon narrowed the group which can constitutionally be removed for cause from the
penalty determination to persons in categories 5 and 6 [hereinafter Witherspoon-excludables].
Categorization of all types of jurors in a venire:
(1) "Automatic Death Penalty" Group-all individuals who will automatically vote for the
death penalty.
(2) "Favor Death Penalty" Group-all individuals favoring capital punishment but who will
not vote to impose it every time.
(3) "Indifferent" Group-individuals neither favoring nor opposing the death penalty.
(4) "Oppose Death Penalty" Group-individuals opposing or having doubts about the death
penalty but who will not automatically vote against it in every case.
(5) "Nullifiers"-individuals who are not impartial since they state they will not fairly and
impartially determine guilt if the death penalty is a prospect.
(6) "Guilt Phase Includables"-individuals who will not vote to impose the death penalty but
who indicate they could fairly and impartially determine a defendant's guilt.
These categories were adapted from Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d 1, 20, 616 P.2d
1301, 1310-11, 168 Cal. Rptr. 128, 138 (1980) and Brief for Amici Curiae by the American
Psychological Ass'n at 4-5, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No. 84-1865).
17. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 522 n.21.
18. Id. at 521.
19. Witherspoon contended that the death-qualified jury,
unlike one chosen at random from a cross-section of the community, must necessar-
ily be biased in favor of conviction, for the kind of juror who would be unperturbed
by the prospect of sending a man to his death .... is the kind of juror who would too
readily ignore the presumption of the defendant's innocence, accept the prosecution's
versions of the facts, and return a verdict of guilt.
Id. at 516-17.
20. The petitioner in Witherspoon presented a completed social science study to substanti-
ate his conviction-proneness claim by W. Wilson, Belief in Capital Punishment and Jury Per-
formance (unpublished manuscript, University of Texas) [hereinafter Wilson], and fragments
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these juries are more likely to convict than noncapital juries, was "too tenta-
tive and fragmentary" to support a finding of conviction-proneness. 21 The
Court, however, did not foreclose the possibility that such a determination
could be made in some future case, and left an open invitation for additional
evidence on this issue.22
It was not until 1986, in Lockhart v. McCree,23 that the Supreme Court
was faced with an overwhelming body of evidence supporting the convic-
of later completed studies by Goldberg, Toward Expansion of Witherspoon: Capital Scruples,
Jury Bias, and the Use of Psychological Data to Raise Presumptions in the Law, 5 HARV. C.R.-
C.L. L. REV. 53 (1970) [hereinafter Goldberg]; and H. ZEISEL, SOME DATA ON JUROR ATtI-
TUDES TOWARD CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (Univ. of Chicago Monograph 1968) [hereinafter
Zeisel].
The Wilson study questioned junior and senior college students in Texas on how they would
vote as jurors after reading five written descriptions of criminal cases. Wilson then compared
the percentage of guilty votes to the students' answers to questions regarding their own
"scruples" against the death penalty. He found that persons without scruples against capital
punishment will vote to convict, impose heavier penalties, and favor the prosecution more
often than persons with scruples against the death penalty. This study was criticized for its
lack of sophistication, its use of college students as subjects, its use of written stimulus materi-
als which were not sufficiently realistic, and its failure to simulate group deliberation which is
inherent to the jury system.
Goldberg focused on the relationship between an individual's attitudes toward capital pun-
ishment and conviction-proneness by using written descriptions like Wilson's to study 200
undergraduates in Atlanta. The results Goldberg obtained were consistent with Wilson's re-
sults. The study, however, suffered the same scientific shortcomings as Wilson's study.
The Zeisel study used actual jurors who had participated in criminal trials in Chicago and
Brooklyn to show that they also demonstrated the conviction-proneness shown in the Wilson
and Goldberg studies. The only criticism levied at the Zeisel study was that it failed to con-
sider categorizations of jurors as articulated in Witherspoon. The group of scrupled jurors
studied by Zeisel were oppose death penalty jurors, nullifiers, and guilt phase includables.
Nullifiers should not have been included in the survey of scrupled jurors. See supra note 16.
See also Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 27-33, 616 P.2d at 1315-19, 168 Cal. Rptr. at
142-46; Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1294-96 (1983); Brief for Amici Curiae by the
American Psychological Ass'n at 4-9, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No. 84-
1865).
21. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 517.
22. Id. at 520 n.18. The Court observed that
a defendant convicted by such a jury in some future case might still attempt to estab-
lish that the jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt. If he were to succeed in
that effort, the question would then arise whether the State's interest in submitting
the penalty issue to a jury capable of imposing capital punishment may be vindicated
at the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt
or innocence-given the possibility of accommodating both interests by means of a
bifurcated trial, using one jury to decide guilt and another to fix punishment.
Id. (emphasis in original).
See id. at 541 n. I (White, J., dissenting). Justice White "would not wholly foreclose the
possibility of a showing that certain restrictions on jury membership imposed because of jury
participation in penalty determination produce a jury which is not constitutionally constituted
for the purpose of determining guilt." Id.
23. 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
[Vol. 36:287
1986] Conviction-Proneness 291
tion-proneness contention.24 McCree presented numerous post- Witherspoon
social science studies which establish a near unanimous opinion25 among
legal researchers that death qualification produces a conviction-prone jury.26
24. In addition to the Wilson study and the final texts of the Goldberg and Zeisel studies,
see supra note 20, the respondent, McCree, presented: Jurow, New Data on the Effect of a
"Death-Qualified" Jury on the Guilt Determination Process, 84 HARV. L. REV. 567 (1971)
[hereinafter Jurow]; Cowan, Thompson & Ellsworth, The Effects of Death-Qualification on
Jurors'Predisposition to Convict and on the Quality of Deliberation, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 53
(1984) [hereinafter Cowan]; Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Study No. 2016 (1971) [hereinafter
Harris]; Bronson, On the Conviction Proneness and Representativeness of the Death-Qualified
Jury: An Empirical Study of Colorado Veniremen, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1970) [hereinafter
Bronson-Colorado]; Bronson, Does the Exclusion of Scrupled Jurors in Capital Cases Make the
Jury More Likely to Convict? Some Evidence from California, 3 WOODROW WILSON L.J. 11
(1980) [hereinafter Bronson-California]; Fitzgerald & Ellsworth, Due Process vs. Crime Con-
trol. Death Qualification and Jury Attitudes, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 31 (1984) [hereinafter
Fitzgerald]; Precision Research, Inc., Survey No. 1286 (1981) [hereinafter Precision Survey];
Thompson, Cowan, Ellsworth & Harrington, Death Penalty Attitudes and Conviction Prone-
ness, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 95 (1984) [hereinafter Thompson]; Ellsworth, Bukaty, Cowan &
Thompson, The Death-Qualified Jury and the Defense of Insanity, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 81
(1984) [hereinafter Ellsworth]; A. Young, Arkansas Archival Study (1981) (unpublished)
[hereinafter Arkansas]; Haney, On the Selection of Capital Juries: The Biasing Effects of the
Death-Qualification Process, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 121 (1984) [hereinafter Haney]. See also
Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1762-63 nn.4-6. For a discussion on the results of these
studies, see infra note 26.
25. Contra Osser & Bernstein, The Death-Oriented Jury Shall Live, 1 SAN FERN. V.L.
REV. 253 (1968). This study contradicts the studies used in McCree. However, the study was
not discussed in McCree, and it has been criticized as "incompetent" due to its flawed method-
ology. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 41-42, 616 P.2d at 1325-26, 128 Cal. Rptr.
at 153 n.80.
26. The post- Witherspoon studies are considered to be more scientifically precise and le-
gally relevant than the Wilson, Goldberg, and Zeisel studies. See supra note 20.
The Jurow study, supra note 24, presented audio simulations of two murder trials to 211
employees of Sperry Rand Corporation in Long Island, New York. These subjects first com-
pleted a questionnaire on death penalty attitudes. After hearing the trial tape, the subjects
were asked to vote guilty or not guilty. Jurow found that there was a direct correlation be-
tween pro-death penalty views and conviction-proneness.
Harris, supra note 24, conducted a nationwide person-to-person interview poll of 2,069
adults. The subjects were instructed to assume they were members of a jury in a criminal trial.
Each subject was asked attitudinal questions which identified Witherspoon-excludables. The
poll showed that death-qualified jurors voted to convict more often than Witherspoon-exclud-
ables and that more blacks and women would be excluded from jury service by death qualifica-
tion.
The Jurow and Harris studies were legitimately criticized for their failure to distinguish
nullifiers from guilt phase includables in the group of Witherspoon-excludables because it was
necessary to prove that guilt phase includables were more conviction-prone than death-quali-
fied jurors since guilt phase includables could be impartial in a guilt determination whereas
nullifiers could not. See supra note 16.
This proof was supplied by the Cowan study, supra note 24. Cowan first questioned subjects
on their willingness to impose the death penalty. Those jurors who could not impose the death
penalty and who could not fairly determine guilt in capital cases were identified as nullifiers
and were excluded from the study. Cowan then identified 258 death-qualified jurors and 30
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While acknowledging the adequacy and validity of this research, the Court
held that the Constitution does not prohibit the use of death-qualified juries
during the guilt phase of capital trials, even if such juries are conviction-
prone.27
guilt phase includables. These individuals were shown videotaped reenactments of an actual
murder trial. The guilt phase includables were mixed with the death-qualified jurors and the
groups deliberated. The results showed that death-qualified jurors were more prone to find a
defendant guilty than the guilt phase includables. This study confirmed the findings of the
earlier studies while overcoming most of the criticisms of those studies.
The Bronson-Colorado study, supra note 24, interviewed 718 people drawn from jury lists in
Colorado. The interviewees were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with statements
about the criminal justice system and about capital punishment. The survey showed that per-
sons who strongly support capital punishment tend to be pro-prosecution.
The Bronson California study, supra note 24, was modeled after the Colorado study. Two
series of groups were interviewed, one group of 755 in Butte County, California and another
group of 707 in Los Angeles, Sacramento, and Stockton, California. The results in California
were consistent with the Bronson-Colorado results: pro-death penalty jurors are more likely to
be pro-prosecution jurors. Bronson's two studies confirmed the theory that attitudes about the
death penalty are associated with other distinct perspectives regarding the criminal justice
system.
Fitzgerald, supra note 24, interviewed 811 randomly selected, jury-eligible individuals in
Alameda County, California and found a very high statistically significant difference between
the pro-prosecution attitudes of death- qualified jurors and guilt phase includables. Addition-
ally, the study found that guilt phase includables constituted 17% of all jurors in jury pools.
The Precision Survey, supra note 24, used questions from the Fitzgerald study to poll 407
people in the state of Arkansas. The poll determined that 11% of all venirepersons were guilt
phase includables (fair and impartial on the question of guilt).
Thompson, supra note 24, presented a videotape of prosecution and defense witness testi-
mony to a group of potential jurors. Death-qualified jurors tended to interpret evidence more
favorably for the prosecution than Witherspoon-excludables. Thompson theorized that such
tendencies indicate that death-qualified juries have a lower "threshold of conviction" than
juries which are not death-qualified.
Ellsworth, supra note 24, studied individuals who had been previously classified as death-
qualified jurors or Witherspoon-excludables and measured their tendency to vote guilty or not
guilty after reading four summaries of cases where pleas of insanity were entered. Wither-
spoon-excludables found defendants insane more often than death-qualified jurors.
The Arkansas Study, supra note 24, reviewed transcripts from Arkansas Supreme Court voir
dires in capital cases. Eight percent of Arkansas men and 13% of all women were found to be
guilt phase includables.
Haney, supra note 24, studied the effects of the voir dire, death qualification process on
jurors since it was believed that this process subjected jurors to extremely suggestive pretrial
conditioning. Thirty-two subjects viewed a videotape of a standard voir dire, and only seven
believed that the death penalty was the appropriate penalty for an individual accused of a
capital crime. Thirty-five subjects viewed a death-qualifying voir dire and twenty believed that
the death penalty was appropriate. See Hovey v. Superior Court, 28 Cal. 3d at 33-60, 616 P.2d
at 1319-46, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 146-68; Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273, 1296-1305 (E.D.
Ark. 1983); Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 232-35 (8th Cir. 1985); Brief for Amici Curiae by
the American Psychological Ass'n at 10-19, Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986) (No.
84-1865).
27. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1759.
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Ardia McCree was convicted of capital felony murder28 by a jury which
was death-qualified according to the guidelines first established in Wither-
spoon.29 Those jurors who stated that they could not consider the death
penalty as punishment were removed for cause at voir dire, over McCree's
objections.3" The jury found McCree guilty of capital felony murder and set
his punishment at life imprisonment without parole.3" McCree appealed his
conviction to the Arkansas Supreme Court, alleging that jurors were im-
properly excluded at voir dire.32 The court, however, found no evidence of
improper exclusion under the Witherspoon requirements.33
McCree filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus34 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas. McCree's petition was
consolidated with another habeas petition on the same issue.35 The state's
power to exclude jurors from the penalty phase, as outlined in Witherspoon,
was not contested by McCree,3 6 nor was the state's power to remove jurors
who stated they could not impartially determine guilt given the prospect that
death would be imposed in a later phase of the trial.37 Focusing solely on
those jurors who could fairly determine guilt or innocence but who could not
impose the death penalty during the sentencing phase,38 McCree alleged that
the exclusion of these jurors resulted in an unrepresentative jury which was
more likely than a noncapital jury to find guilt.39
The district court heard extensive testimony and reviewed numerous so-
cial science studies concerning the effects of removal of Witherspoon-exclud-
ables from the guilt phase of bifurcated capital trials." After analyzing all
of the evidence, the district court held that a death-qualified jury is less than
28. McCree v. State, 266 Ark. 465, 467, 585 S.W.2d 938, 939 (1979), rev'd sub nom.
Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), a/I'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985),
re''d sub nom. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
29. 391 U.S. at 520-21. See supra note 11.
30. McCree, 266 Ark. at 471-73, 585 S.W.2d at 941-42.
31. Id. at 467, 585 S.W.2d at 939.
32. Id. at 470, 585 S.W.2d at 941.
33. Id. at 473-74, 585 S.W.2d at 942.
34. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1982).
35. Grigsby v. Mabry, 569 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Ark. 1983), aff'd, 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir.
1985), rev'd sub noma. Lockhart v. McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986). The district court case was
originated by James Grigsby who was convicted of capital murder by a death-qualified jury in
an Arkansas state court. Grigsby filed a habeas corpus petition and the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas ordered an evidentiary hearing. Before the decision
was rendered, however, Grigsby died and his case became moot. 569 F. Supp. at 1277 & n.2.
36. See supra note 11.
37. See supra note 16 for a discussion of nullifiers.
38. See supra note 16 for a discussion of guilt phase includables.
39. See Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1275-76.
40. Id. at 1287-1308. See supra notes 24-26 and accompanying text.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
neutral with respect to guilt, in violation of a capital defendant's right to a
fair and impartial jury. Such a jury was also found to be unrepresentative of
the community from which it is drawn, in violation of the sixth amendment
representative cross section requirement. 4 ' The court recommended that
states use separate juries in bifurcated trials, or modify their present proce-
dure so that the guilt phase jury in a capital trial is made to resemble the
juries in noncapital trials.42
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
district court's decision, finding substantial support for the contention that a
death-qualified jury is conviction-prone and therefore does not constitute a
cross-sectional representation of the community.43 The court chose not to
prescribe the procedural modification necessary to remedy the bifurcated
capital jury system, and left the decision to the discretion of the state.4 4
The United States Supreme Court, in a six to three decision 45 reversed the
decision of the court of appeals, finding no constitutional violation in the use
of death-qualified juries, in spite of the recognition that these juries are con-
viction-prone. 46 The Court also found no violation of the cross section re-
quirement, holding that Witherspoon-excludables do not constitute a distinct
group in the community warranting cross-sectional representation.4 7
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall, joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens, charged the majority with blatant disregard for the clear implica-
tion of the evidence, as well as for the underlying constitutional principles
involved.48 Focusing solely on the impartiality claim, the dissenters argued
that when a conviction is sought in a capital case, a procedure such as death
41. See Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1321.
42. Id. at 1319.
43. Grigsby v. Mabry, 758 F.2d 226, 229 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub noma. Lockhart v.
McCree, 106 S. Ct. 1758 (1986).
44. Id.
45. The majority opinion, delivered by Justice Rehnquist, was joined by Chief Justice
Burger and by Justices White, Powell, and O'Connor. Justice Blackmun concurred in the
result. Justice Marshall filed a dissenting opinion which was joined by Justices Brennan and
Stevens.
46. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1764. "[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the
studies are both methodologically valid and adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in
fact produces juries somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries. We
hold, nonetheless, that the Constitution does not prohibit the States from 'death qualifying'
juries in capital cases." Id.
47. Id. at 1766. "The group of 'Witherspoon-excludables' involved in the case at bar dif-
fers significantly from the groups we have previously recognized as 'distinctive.' " Id.
48. Id. at 1774-75 (Marshall, J., dissenting). "This disregard for the clear import of the
evidence tragically misconstrues the settled constitutional principles that guarantee a defend-
ant the right to a fair trial and an impartial jury whose composition is not biased toward the
prosecution." Id.
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qualification, which "diminishes the reliability of the guilt determination,"
should be struck down.49
This Note will present an historical overview of the concept of jury impar-
tiality, focusing particularly on the neutral jury as representative of a cross
section of the community. The Court's application of this concept to the
death-qualified jury will be evaluated, along with the Court's claim that
Witherspoon-excludables do not constitute a distinctive group for cross-sec-
tional purposes. Additionally, the Note will examine the issue of jury predis-
position with emphasis on judicial interpretations of the conviction-
proneness evidence. An analysis of McCree will suggest that the ideal of
impartiality has been sacrificed to preserve the state's interest in using single
juries in capital trials. The Note will conclude that, because death- qualified
juries have been found constitutional, the McCree decision may represent an
end to the long succession of case law attempting to establish the conviction-
proneness of death- qualified juries.
I. THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
A. The Fourteenth Amendment Requirement of a Representative Jury
The requirement that a neutral jury represent a fair cross section of the
community5" derives from early cases5 addressing the equal protection pro-
hibition of racial discrimination in the selection of jurors.52 In 1940, Smith
v. Texas53 addressed a claim that racial discrimination was used to inten-
tionally and systematically exclude blacks from the grand jury which in-
dicted the black defendant. 54 Voicing the ideal that equal protection of the
laws must be guaranteed to all, the Court reversed the defendant's convic-
tion, holding that a jury must truly represent the community to serve as
49. Id. at 1782 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625, 638
(1980)).
50. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530 (1975).
51. See Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879), which first emphasized the idea
that a jury should be "a body of men composed of the peers or equals of the person whose right
it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his neighbors, fellows, associates, persons
having the same legal status in society as that which he holds." Id. at 308. In this case, the
Court invalidated a state statute which excluded blacks from serving as jurors solely because of
race and color. Since the Court considered the fourteenth amendment as prohibiting the im-
plications of inferiority which such discrimination promoted, it followed that the all-white
grand jury which convicted the black defendant was not truly representative of the commu-
nity, and mandated a reversal of the trial conviction. Id. at 308-12.
52. See, e.g., Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940);
Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354 (1939).
53. 311 U.S. 128 (1940).
54. Id. at 129-30.
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
"instrument[s] an of public justice."55 The exclusion of blacks and other-
wise qualified groups from jury service was found to violate constitutional
principles and the basic concepts of a democratic society.56
Since illegal and unconstitutional jury selection procedures unnecessarily
taint the entire judicial process, the Court has held that an otherwise valid
conviction must be reversed, even where no actual bias to the defendant has
occurred.5 7 In Peters v. Kiff,5 8 the petitioner, a white man, claimed that
blacks were systematically excluded from serving on the grand jury that is-
sued his indictment. 59 Because the trial took place before the sixth amend-
ment was made applicable to the states,6" the Court conducted an equal
protection and due process61 analysis and concluded that the conviction was
unconstitutional.
62
The Court stressed that when certain identifiable groups are removed
from the jury pool, "qualities of human nature" and "perspective[s] on
human events that may have unsuspected importance' 63 are absent from the
group's deliberations. The Court found great potential for harm in such an
unrepresentative jury and the conviction was reversed, even though the de-
fendant could prove no actual bias to himself.64 In dictum, the Court offered
that under the sixth amendment, a defendant's conviction would similarly be
reversed if issued by an unrepresentative jury, regardless of whether the de-
fendant suffered any actual bias.6 5
The requirement of community representativeness in the fourteenth
amendment 66 context has also been extended to cases addressing the consti-
55. Id. at 130.
56. Id. See Pierre, 306 U.S. at 355-58. In Pierre, blacks were deliberately excluded from
service in grand and petit juries. The Court reversed the defendant's conviction finding that
our traditional concept of justice is violated when particular groups, classes, or races are ex-
cluded from jury service. Id.
57. See Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 286 (1947); Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522,
526 (1975).
58. 407 U.S. 493 (1972).
59. Id. at 494.
60. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
61. See infra note 66.
62. Peters, 407 U.S. at 505.
63. Id. at 503-04.
64. Id. at 504.
65. Id. at 500.
66. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, which provides in pertinent part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immuni-
ties of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
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tutionality of death- qualified juries. 67 In Witherspoon, the prosecution exer-
cised unlimited peremptory challenges to exclude all venirepersons who
expressed reservations about capital punishment.68 Focusing solely on this
jury during penalty phase deliberations, the Court held that a death sentence
is unconstitutional if it is recommended by a jury from which all venireper-
sons having doubts about capital punishment are removed. 69  While ac-
knowledging the state's interest in obtaining jurors capable of imposing the
death sentence without violating personal beliefs,7° the Court reasoned that
a capital jury must express the "conscience of the community" when it delib-
erates on the question of life imprisonment or death.7
To accommodate both the state's interest in a death- qualified jury and the
defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of guilt, the Wither-
spoon Court restricted permissible juror exclusions to nullifiers and guilt
phase includables, or those persons who will not vote for the death penalty
under any circumstance.72 Because exclusions on any broader basis were
considered to violate the requirement that juries reflect the viewpoints and
perspectives of the community, the Court decided that the new Witherspoon
rule should be applied retroactively to invalidate all prior death sentences
imposed by similar unconstitutional penalty phase juries.7 3
67. See, e.g., Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 510; Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543
(1968).
68. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 513.
69. Id. at 522.
70. Id. at 518-19.
The only justification the State has offered for the jury-selection technique it em-
ployed here is that individuals who express serious reservations about capital punish-
ment cannot be relied upon to vote for it even when the laws of the State and the
instructions of the trial judge would make death the proper penalty.
Id.
71. Id. at 519-20.
[A] jury that must choose between life imprisonment and capital punishment can do
little more-and must do nothing less-than express the conscience of the commu-
nity on the ultimate question of life or death. Yet, in a nation less than half of whose
people believe in the death penalty, a jury composed exclusively of such people can-
not speak for the community. Culled of all who harbor doubts about the wisdom of
capital punishment-of all who would be reluctant to pronounce the extreme pen-
alty-such a jury can speak only for a distinct and dwindling minority.
Id.
72. Id. at 522 n.21. See supra note 16.
73. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22.
[T]he jury-selection standards employed here necessarily undermined "the very in-
tegrity of the ... process" that decided the petitioner's fate, and we have concluded
that neither the reliance of law enforcement officials, nor the impact of a retroactive
holding on the administration of justice warrants a decision against the fully retroac-
tive application of the holding we announce today.
Id. (citations omitted). See White, The Constitutional Invalidity of Convictions Imposed by
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B. The Sixth Amendment Representativeness Requirement
In 1968, the Supreme Court, in Duncan v. Louisiana,7 4 found that the
sixth amendment right to a trial by jury in criminal cases was sufficiently
fundamental to the principles of liberty and justice," to extend those rights
to protect against state action.76 Prior to this decision, the concept of a rep-
resentative jury had been developed in federal court cases such as Thiel v.
Southern Pacific Co. 77 There, the Court found that the systematic and inten-
tional exclusion of a class of daily wage earners78 reflected unconstitutional
disregard for the tradition of trial by jury.79 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter
observed that the focus for determining improper jury selection is whether
an excluded group possesses a "different outlook psychologically and eco-
nomically" and whether they "have a different sense of justice, and a differ-
ent conception of a juror's responsibility."8 Consistent with this argument,
the Court found that daily wage earners or laborers constituted a substantial
Death-Qualified Juries, 58 CORNELL L. REV. 1176, 1213-15 (1973) (exploring Witherspoon as
precedent for a finding that a new procedure of jury selection should be given retroactive
application).
74. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
75. Contra Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937), rev'd, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
"The right to trial by jury... [is] not of the very essence of a scheme of ordered liberty ....
Few would be so narrow or provincial as to maintain that a fair and enlightened system of
justice would be impossible without [it]." Id.
76. Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-58.
77. 328 U.S. 217 (1946). See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 83-86 (1942) (the
exclusion of all women not members of the Illinois League of Women Voters from a federal
jury panel denied the defendant an impartial jury drawn from a cross section of the
community).
78. "Wage earners" is used to denote the class of laborers who work for a daily wage.
The court clerk testified in Thiel:
If I see in the directory the name of John Jones and it says he is a longshoreman, I do
not put his name in, because I have found by experience that that man will not serve
as a juror, and I will not get people who will qualify. The minute that a juror is
called into court on a venire and says he is working for $10 a day and cannot afford
to work for four, the Judge has never made one of those men serve, and so in order to
avoid putting names of people in who I know won't become jurors in the court, won't
qualify as jurors in this court, I do leave them out ....
Thiel, 328 U.S. at 222.
79. Id. at 220. See Glasser, 315 U.S. at 85.
Our notions of what a proper jury is have developed in harmony with our basic
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government. For "[i]t is part of
the established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the
jury be a body truly representative of the community."
Id. (quoting Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940)).
80. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 230 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (While asserting this notion Justice
Frankfurter dissented from the majority's determination that wage earners possess a distinct
social outlook.). Compare supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text with Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting views.
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portion of the community and that intentional exclusion of this entire eco-
nomic class was unconstitutional."' The Court went further and suggested
that federal jury selection procedures could not systematically and intention-
ally exclude social, religious, or political groups without violating the cross
section requirement.82 As in Peters and Witherspoon, the Court reasoned
that exclusion of these groups unconstitutionally removes from the jury val-
uable viewpoints and perspectives which are inherent in the community at
large.83
Taylor v. Louisiana 84 considered the cross section requirement in a case
where women were excluded from a jury venire.8 5 The Court emphasized
that petit juries did not have to "mirror" the community to meet the cross
section requirement.86 Instead, they should represent the common sense of
the community and thereby provide the necessary balance against "overzeal-
ous ... prosecutors" and "overconditioned ... judges.",87 Taylor's right to
81. Thiel, 328 U.S. at 225.
82. Id. at 220. See Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187 (1946). In Ballard, the sixth
amendment right to an impartial jury was considered. The Court found that
evil lies in the admitted exclusion of an eligible class or group in the community in
disregard of the prescribed standards of jury selection. The systematic and inten-
tional exclusion of women, like the exclusion of a racial group, or an economic or
social class, deprives the jury system of the broad base it was designed by Congress to
have in our democratic society.
Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195 (citations omitted).
83. See Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220. See also supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text.
84. 419 U.S. at 522.
85. Id. at 525.
86. Id. at 538.
87. Id. at 530 (citing Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56). In Taylor, the Court went on to note:
This prophylactic vehicle is not provided if the jury pool is made up of only special
segments of the populace or if large, distinctive groups are excluded from the pool.
Community participation in the administration of the criminal law, moreover, is not
only consistent with our democratic heritage but is also critical to public confidence
in the fairness of the criminal justice system. Restricting jury service to only special
groups or excluding identifiable segments playing major roles in the community can-
not be squared with the constitutional concept of jury trial.
Id.
See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 100 (1970). In Williams, the Court concluded that a
jury composed of six persons instead of the usual twelve adequately represented a cross section
of the community.
The purpose of the jury trial ... is to prevent oppression by the Government. "Pro-
viding an accused with the right to be tried by a jury of his peers gave him an inesti-
mable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the
compliant, biased, or eccentric judge." Given this purpose, the essential feature of a
jury obviously lies in the interposition between the accused and his accuser of the
common sense judgment of a group of laymen, and in the community participation
and shared responsibility that results from that group's determination of guilt or
innocence.
Id. (quoting Duncan, 391 U.S. at 155-56).
1986]
Catholic University Law Review
such a jury was held to be violated by the exclusion of women from the
venire."8 The rationale established in Peters8 9 was echoed here in that Tay-
lor, a male, was not a member of the excluded class.90
In Lockett v. Ohio,91 the Court reviewed the cross section requirement of
the sixth amendment as it applied to the practice of death qualification.9 2
Lockett was charged with aggravated murder. At her trial, four venireper-
sons were excluded for cause when they unequivocally expressed that they
could not impartially decide guilt given the prospect that the death penalty
might be imposed. 93 Lockett claimed that the exclusion of these jurors vio-
lated the Taylor requirement94 that juries typify the community.9 5 The
Court denied this claim holding that the right to a representative jury does
not convey the right to be tried by jurors who will disregard the evidence
presented and refuse to impose the death penalty. 96 The Court in Lockett,
however, was not asked to address the cross section requirement as it applied
solely to the guilt phase jury, and simply adhered to the precedent of Wither-
spoon to reach its decision.
97
C. The Cognizable Class Requirement
Duren v. Missouri9" presented the Court with another situation where wo-
men were excluded from the jury venire9 9 and introduced the requirement
that excluded groups be deemed "distinctive" before a sixth amendment vio-
lation can be found."° Under the terms of Duren, a prima facie violation of
88. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538.
89. See supra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
90. Taylor, 419 U.S. at 526.
91. 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
92. Id. at 596.
93. Id. These jurors were properly excluded under Witherspoon since they were nullifiers.
See supra note 16. See also Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38, 50 (1980) ("We repeat that the State
may bar from jury service those whose beliefs about capital punishment would lead them to
ignore the law or violate their oaths.").
94. 419 U.S. at 538.
95. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596.
96. Id. at 596-97. See Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d 1432, 1442 (5th Cir. 1985); Keeten v.
Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133-34 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 106 S. Ct. 2259 (1986); Smith v.
Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 582-83 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Spinkellink
v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 596-98 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979); United
States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362-63 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 854 (1972).
97. Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596-97.
98. 439 U.S. 357 (1979).
99. Although women constituted 54% of the population of Jackson County, Missouri
where Duren arose, only 15% of all jurypersons on venires were women. See id. at 364-66.
100. Id. at 364; see Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 495 (1977) (Mexican-Americans
are a distinctive class); Thiel, 328 U.S. at 224 (discussed supra notes 77-83 and accompanying
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the cross section requirement occurs when venire representation of a distinc-
tive group "is not fair and reasonable in relation to the number of such per-
sons in the community," and when "this underrepresentation is due to
systematic exclusion of the group in the jury-selection process.'' ° The
Court stressed that when any exclusion is made which is tailored to further a
significant state interest, proper caution must be exerted to prevent the un-
necessary exclusion of broad community groups.' 0 2 Upholding Taylor, the
Court found women sufficiently distinct so that their exclusion created a
prima facie violation of the fair cross section requirement.10 3
Since Witherspoon-excludables share attitudes toward capital punishment
and the criminal justice system that are distinct from those attitudes pos-
sessed by death- qualified jurors," it is significant to discern whether this
group of excluded jurors is "distinct" under the terms of Duren. 105 In Ad-
ams v. Texas, 10 6 the Court refused to allow jurors to be excluded because
they were unable to state whether their deliberations on guilt would be in
any way affected by the prospect of capital punishment. 107 Such an exclu-
sion was deemed "broader" than those exclusions permitted by Wither-
spoon. 18 The recognition that the absence of such a broad group of jurors
would deprive the defendant of an impartial jury during the penalty phase
permits the inference to be drawn that a jury could not function properly
without the inclusion of the viewpoints and perspectives of these jurors. 09
Under the statutory sentencing scheme used by the State of Texas, the
jury's role at the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial is limited to a
determination of facts which are used to answer three questions designed to
set penalty. "0 In this specific capacity, the Texas penalty phase jury is indis-
tinguishable from any guilt phase jury, whose sole function is to determine
text); United States v. Yazzie, 660 F.2d 422, 426 (10th Cir. 1981) (Indians are a distinctive
class), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923 (1982); cf United States v. Toner, 728 F.2d 115, 130 (2d Cir.
1984) (exclusion of noncitizens is not a constitutional violation); United States v. Olson, 473
F.2d 686, 688-89 (8th Cir.) (persons between the ages 18 and 21 are not a distinct group), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 905 (1973); United States v. Gibson, 480 F. Supp. 339 (S.D. Ohio 1979)
(members of labor unions are not a cognizable group).
101. 439 U.S. at 364.
102. Id. at 370.
103. Id. at 367.
104. See infra note 125 and accompanying text.
105. 439 U.S. at 364.
106. 448 U.S. 38 (1980).
107. Id. at 50.
108. See supra note 16 for categorizations of excludable jurors.
109. See generally Adams, 448 U.S. at 50.
110. Id. at 40-41. At the penalty phase of a bifurcated capital trial, if the jury finds the
facts sufficient to answer "yes" to each question below, the death penalty is imposed. A "no"'
answer to any one question warrants imposition of life imprisonment. The jury must decide:
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the facts and apply the law.111 The Adams Court focused on this unique
penalty phase jury and prohibited the exclusion of jurors who could not de-
finitively state that their deliberations on issues of fact would be influ-
enced.1 12 By citing Witherspoon, the Court found that the exclusion of such
a broad group of jurors would result in a jury which could not speak for the
community.' 13 It follows that the distinct perspectives that the Court re-
quired these jurors to contribute to the Texas penalty phase jury 14 would
similarly be valuable to any guilt phase jury since these juries were consid-
ered to serve the same roles. 5
This reasoning is directly supported by dictum in Ballew v. Georgia. 16 In
Ballew, the State of Georgia issued a conviction using a five-person jury.
The petitioner requested a reversal of that conviction alleging that a jury of
five could not constitutionally represent the community. 7 The Court
found the evidence sufficient to suggest that smaller juries are less likely to
engage in "effective group deliberation," and would thereby fail to apply the
"common sense of the community to the facts" of a given case.' The value
choices 9 which are inherent to many jury decisions were also discussed,
and the Court emphasized that the counterbalancing of various predisposi-
tions and biases on a jury would be jeopardized by limiting jury size to
five.' 2 ° Significant in Ballew then, is the Court's recognition that the inclu-
sion of various attitudes is vital to a fair, impartial, and representative
(1) Whether the conduct of the defendant that caused the death of the deceased
was committed deliberately and with the reasonable expectation that the death of the
deceased or another would result;
(2) Whether there is a probability that the defendant would commit criminal acts
of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society; and
(3) If raised by the evidence, whether the conduct of the defendant in killing the
deceased was unreasonable in response to the provocation, if any, by the deceased.
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 37.071(b) (Vernon 1981 & Supp. 1986).
111. See Adams, 448 U.S. at 54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also Gillers, Proving the
Prejudice of Death-Qualified Juries After Adams v. Texas-Reviewing White, Life in the Bal-
ance: Procedural Safeguards in Capital Cases, 47 U. PITT. L. REV. 219, 244-47 (1985).
112. Adams, 448 U.S. at 40.
113. Compare id. at 50-51 with Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520. See McCree, 106 S. Ct. at
1777.
114. See generally Adams, 448 U.S. at 50-51.
115. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
116. 435 U.S. 223 (1978).
117. Id. at 226-27. Cf Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (addressing the use of six-
person juries in Florida).
118. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232-34.
119. See Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519 n.15 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101
(1957) (juries should reflect society's "evolving standards of decency").
120. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 233-34.
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jury. 121
Keeten v. Garrison 122 presented the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina with a claim that compliance with the
Witherspoon death- qualification guidelines causes a prima facie violation of
the sixth amendment representativeness requirement. 2 ' The petitioner
presented numerous sociological studies which definitively established that
persons with conscientious scruples against the death penalty possess atti-
tudes about the criminal justice system which are distinct from persons who
are for the death penalty, and from persons broadly opposed to capital pun-
ishment. t24 The Court summarized these studies and established that indi-
viduals willing to impose the death penalty tend to favor testimony of the
prosecution's witnesses while doubting defense witnesses, advocate stricter
crime control measures, feel that the courts too often allow guilty defendants
released because of "technical loopholes," and find proof beyond a reason-
able doubt more readily than those individuals with conscientious scruples
about capital punishment. t2 ' The Court also found that the disproportion-
ate exclusion of blacks and women was the by-product of death qualification
since these groups tend to oppose the death penalty more than white men.' 2 6
Citing the requirements established by the Supreme Court in Duren and
Taylor, the district court found that persons unwilling to impose the death
penalty are a cognizable group in the community, representing eight to
twenty-three percent of the population.' 2 7 Paralleling Witherspoon, the
court found that an exclusion of these jurors would prevent the guilt phase
jury from reflecting the "collective conscience of the community."' 28 The
court then focused on whether the state's interest in saving taxpayer money
by preserving the use of single juries in the bifurcated jury procedure justi-
fied exclusion of these jurors.' 29 Financial reasons were deemed insufficient
justification and the court found a violation of the sixth amendment cross
121. See id. at 232-39.
122. 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C.), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
123. Id. at 1170.
124. See id. at 1171-77, 1181-82. Keeten presented the following: Fitzgerald, supra note
24; Bronson-Colorado, supra note 24; Bronson-California, supra note 24; Harris, supra note
24; Zeisel, supra note 20; Wilson, supra note 20; Goldberg, supra note 20, Jurow, supra note
24; Cowan, supra note 24; Thompson, supra note 24; Haney, supra note 24.
125. Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1171-77, 1181-82.
126. Id. at 1182.
127. Id. at 1179-81. See Harris, supra note 24 (Witherspoon-excludables represent 23% of
all venirepersons); Bronson-Colorado, supra note 24 (8-9%); Fitzgerald, supra note 24 (17%).
128. Compare Keeten. 578 F. Supp. at 1181 with Witherspoon. 391 U.S. at 519.
129. Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1186-87. "The Attorney General argued ... [that] [s]eparate
trials of those issues before separate juries, or separate trial of the punishment issue before a
freshly constituted jury, would be too much of a burden . . . on the taxpayers." Id. at 1186.
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section requirement. 30
The Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, finding that the state's interest
in the use of a single jury outweighed the defendant's interest in a nondeath-
qualified guilt phase jury.' 3 ' Although the court reviewed evidence on juror
attitudes not previously available, it opted to follow the earlier decisions of
the Fifth' 32 and Eleventh' 33 Circuit Courts of Appeals regarding the
cognizability of Witherspoon-excludables. "' Clearly ignoring the suggested
use of two juries in capital cases, the court cited Lockett and held that the
right to a representative jury does not convey the right to be tried by jurors
who will not follow the law.' 35
As these cases demonstrate, courts have interpreted the sixth amendment
representativeness requirement as prohibiting the intentional exclusion of
cognizable groups of individuals from jury venires136 Groups such as
blacks and women have been deemed sufficiently cognizable so that their
exclusion has been found to unconstitutionally fragment the spectrum of
qualities and perspectives which are necessary to a representative jury.' 37
Similarly, one court has reviewed extensive evidence which substantiates the
claim that jurors who are excluded from service on capital juries under the
Witherspoon requirements possess distinct attitudes which are essential to a
fair, representative jury. 138 This court has advanced the notion that the sub-
set of these jurors who could fairly determine guilt 139 should constitutionally
be included on jury panels during the guilt determination portion of bifur-
130. Id. at 1187 ("The State of North Carolina can afford the few extra dollars, if any, that
it might cost to provide fair trials to persons accused of capital felonies.").
131. Keeten v. Garrison, 742 F.2d 129, 133 (4th Cir. 1984).
132. E.g., Smith v. Balkcom, 660 F.2d 573, 582 (5th Cir. 1981) ("It must be remembered
that a jury which reflects a fair cross-section of the community is a goal that is never to be
achieved at the cost of leaving on a jury those veniremen who are legitimately disqualified."),
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 882 (1982); Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 597 (5th Cir. 1978)
("[W]e believe that Florida ... has satisfactorily shown the 'weightier reasons' required by the
Supreme Court in Taylor for the exclusion of such veniremen."), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976
(1979).
133. E.g., Corn v. Zant, 708 F.2d 549, 565 (1 1th Cir. 1983) ("[W]hen veniremen are prop-
erly struck under Witherspoon, their exclusion does not violate the representative cross-section
requirement of the sixth and fourteenth amendments."), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1220 (1984).
134. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 133-34.
135. Id. at 133 (quoting Lockett, 438 U.S. at 596-97).
136. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 364 (discussed supra notes 98-103 and accompanying
text).
137. E.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 58-65 and accompanying text);
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 530 (discussed supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text).
138. E.g., Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1181-82 (discussed supra notes 122-30 and accompany-
ing text).
139. See supra note 16 for a discussion of guilt phase includables.
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cated capital procedures."4° This contention has raised some controversy in
the lower courts 4 and was addressed by the Supreme Court in McCree.
II. CONVICTION-PRONENESS OF DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
A. Historical Conceptions of the Impartial Jury
Long before the sixth amendment right to an impartial jury was made
applicable to the states,' 42 the due process and equal protection clauses of
the fourteenth amendment guaranteed all accused individuals a fair trial
before a neutral jury.'43 In 1886, this concept was addressed in Hayes v.
Missouri,'" where the Court reviewed the constitutionality of a Missouri
statute 45 specifying the peremptory challenges which were permissible in a
capital trial.' 46 To preserve the ideal of impartiality, the Court found that
peremptory challenges were necessary to secure a neutral jury, free "from
any bias against the accused [and] . . . prejudice against [the]
prosecution."' 47
In the context of the fourteenth amendment, the Court once again re-
viewed the concept of jury impartiality in Fay v. New York. 14' There, the
petitioner alleged that the "blue ribbon" jury, 14  which found him guilty,
was partial to the prosecution since all laborers, service employees, and wo-
140. Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1181-82 (discussed supra notes 122-30 and accompanying
text).
141. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
142. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 147-58 (discussed supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text).
143. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955) ("A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic
requirement of due process."); Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 285 (1947) (equal protection
analysis is used to determine the constitutionality of a New York statute governing juror
selection.).
144. 120 U.S. 68 (1887).
145. Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 1900, 1902 (1879) which provided in pertinent part that: "in all
capital cases, except in cities having a population of over 100,000 inhabitants, the state shall be
allowed eight peremptory challenges to jurors, and, in such cities, shall be allowed fifteen."
Hayes, 120 U.S. at 69 (citing the statute).
146. Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70.
147. Id.
148. 332 U.S. 261 (1947). See In re Murchison, 349 U.S. at 133. The ideal of an impartial
jury is also discussed in this case. In reviewing the constitutionality of the one-man judge jury,
the Court noted that the absence of actual bias is the goal our system of law has always en-
deavored to achieve. The Court held that it was unconstitutional for a judge who served as a
one-man grand jury to try, on a later contempt charge, the witnesses who perjured themselves
before him in the grand jury hearing. Id. at 139.
149. The blue ribbon or "special" jury is ordered for a particular trial at the discretion of
the court upon a showing that the case is especially technical or intricate. Venirepersons are
drawn from voting records and are questioned regarding their qualifications to hear a specific
case. Individuals are selected to serve on this jury based on their special qualifications. See
Fay, 332 U.S. at 268-69.
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men were excluded from the panel.' 50 The Court sought the appropriate
balance' 5 ' between the state's interest in obtaining qualified jurors and the
defendant's interest in a fair and unbiased determination of guilt.' 52 Finding
no inconsistencies between the conviction rates of special juries as compared
to those of ordinary juries, the Court upheld the state's use of blue ribbon
juries. '53 However, the Court entertained the possibility that if a disparity in
the conviction ratios of these juries were established, it would indicate that
the use of a special jury violated an individual's right to an impartial jury. 5 4
B. Prior Interpretations of the Conviction-Proneness Evidence
In Witherspoon, the Supreme Court first wrestled with the emerging social
science research addressing the conviction-proneness of death-qualified ju-
ries. "' While finding these early studies too speculative to support a consti-
tutional determination that death-qualified juries are not impartial on the
question of guilt, the Court recognized that the conviction-proneness claim
might someday be substantiated by further proof. 156 Foreseeing the possibil-
ity that such proof would be offered, the Witherspoon Court speculated that
for the practice of using single juries in bifurcated capital trials to continue,
the state's interest in single juries must outweigh the defendant's interest in a
completely fair determination of guilt.' 57 To force a decision on this issue,
legal scholars began research in order to conclusively establish the convic-
tion-proneness indicated by the early studies. Varying degrees of this re-
search have been incorporated in numerous post- Witherspoon impartiality
claims. 158
In 1976, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit re-
viewed additional conviction-proneness evidence in United States ex rel.
Clark v. Fike. 159 In attempting to determine if a correlation existed between
a juror's attitude about the death penalty and his attitude toward conviction,
150. Id. at 272-73.
151. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927) ("Every procedure which would
offer a possible temptation ... not to hold the balance nice, clear and true between the State
and the accused denies the latter due process of law.").
152. See generally Fay, 332 U.S. at 266-69.
153. Id. at 285-86.
154. Id. at 286.
155. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18 & n.10 (discussed supra note 20 and accompanying
text).
156. Id. at 520 n.18 (discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text).
157. Id.
158. E.g., Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968); Mattheson v. King, 751 F.2d
1432, 1442 (5th Cir. 1985); United States ex rel. Townsend v. Twomey, 452 F.2d 350, 362 (7th
Cir.), cert. denied. 409 U.S. 584 (1972).
159. 538 F.2d 750, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied. 429 U.S. 1064 (1977).
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the court reconsidered the three studies available in Witherspoon, 160 sup-
ported by five additional studies. 16' Although the evidence adduced by the
court from the Jurow study 62 was found to indicate that death-qualified
juries tended toward conviction, the court viewed this as a correlation of
attitudes which was deemed insufficient to prove a constitutional violation of
the right to an impartial jury. 163
Reviewing a similar claim, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit in Spinkellink v. Wainwright 164 used a different approach to
the conviction-proneness issue. In a circuitous fashion, the court reasoned
that partiality as a legal concept is not proven when it can be factually shown
that death-qualified juries are more conviction-prone than nondeath-quali-
fled juries. 165 The court emphasized that by establishing that a jury tends
toward conviction-proneness, the petitioner fails to bridge the gap of proving
actual partiality since studies about attitudes are too general to predict be-
havior. 166 To substantiate this decision, the court quoted at length from a
pre- Witherspoon opinion which curiously presupposes that the necessary and
missing element of proof in these cases would show that death- qualified ju-
rors are consciously "hostile" to criminal defendants. 167
160. See supra note 20.
161. In addition to the Wilson, Goldberg, and Zeisel studies, supra note 20, the Clark
Court considered Bronson-Colorado, supra note 24; Harris, supra note 24; Rokeach & McLel-
lan, Dogmatism and the Death Penalty: A Reinterpretation of the Duquesne Poll Data, 8 DuQ.
L. REV. 125 (1970); Oberer, Does Disqualification of Jurors for Scruples Against Capital Pun-
ishment Constitute Denial of Fair Trial on Issues of Guilt 39 TEX. L. REV. 545 (1961); R.
Crosson, An Investigation Into Certain Personality Variables Among Capital Trial Jurors (un-
published Western Reserve Univ. doctoral dissertation, January 1966), cited in Bumper v.
North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543, 546 n.6; and Jurow, supra note 24.
162. See supra note 24.
163. Clark, 538 F.2d at 762.
164. 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 976 (1979).
165. Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 593-94.
When the petitioner asserts that a death-qualified jury is prosecution-prone, he
means that a death-qualified jury is more likely to convict than a nondeath-qualified
jury. Proof that this proposition is true is far from conclusive, but for the moment
we will assume its validity. Even if it is true, the petitioner's contention still must
fail. That a death-qualified jury is more likely to convict than a nondeath- qualified
jury does not demonstrate which jury is impartial. It indicates only that a death-
qualified jury might favor the prosecution and that a nondeath-qualified jury might
favor the defendant.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
166. See generally id. at 594.
167. Id. at 595 (quoting Turberville v. United States, 303 F.2d 411, 420-21 (D.C. Cir.
1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S. 946 (1962)).
No proof is available, so far as we know, and we can imagine none, to indicate that,
generally speaking, persons not opposed to capital punishment are so bent in their
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Once again, in 1981, Smith v. Balkcom 168 presented the Fifth Circuit with
the contention that a death- qualified jury violates the sixth amendment im-
partiality requirement. 169 Smith presented numerous additional social sci-
ence studies,'17  not available when Witherspoon, Clark, and Spinkellink
were decided, which offered uncontradicted support for the conviction-
proneness argument.171 Consistent with the rationale of Spinkellink, 172 the
court concluded that this additional data was irrelevant since proof of con-
viction-proneness does not constitute proof of partiality. 17
As in Spinkellink, 17 the Fifth Circuit did not present a definition of its
concept of impartiality 17' and merely advanced that the new studies estab-
lished a standard for determining a juror's tendency to convict, "not a stan-
dard for measuring impartiality per se."' 176 The court went further and
defined Smith's request for an impartial jury in this context as a request for a
"defendant prone" jury or a jury likely to acquit. 177
The Supreme Court offered little support for the Fifth Circuit's reasoning
on the requirements for proof of partiality in Maggio v. Williams. 178 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court vacated Williams' stay of execution, finding no
hostility to criminals as to be incapable of rendering impartial verdicts on the law
and the evidence in a capital case.
Id. (quoting Turberville, 303 F.2d at 420).
168. 660 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1981).
169. Id. at 575.
170. In addition to the Wilson, Goldberg, and Zeisel studies, supra note 20, reviewed in
Witherspoon, the petitioner presented Bronson-Colorado, Harris, Jurow, and Bronson-Califor-
nia, supra note 24, and preliminary drafts of Fitzgerald, Ellsworth, Thompson, and Haney,
supra note 24.
171. Cf Osser & Bernstein, supra note 25.
172. 578 F.2d at 593-94.
173. Smith, 660 F.2d at 578 n.13.
174. 578 F.2d at 593-95.
175. See generally Smith, 660 F.2d at 575-79.
176. Id. at 578 n.13.
177. Id. at 579.
The guarantee of impartiality cannot mean that the state has a right to present its
case to the jury most likely to return a verdict of guilt, nor can it mean that the
accused has a right to present his case to the jury most likely to acquit. But the
converse is also true. The guarantee cannot mean that the state must present its case
to the jury least likely to convict or impose the death penalty, nor that the defense
must present its case to the jury least likely to find him innocent or vote for life
imprisonment. Yet Smith here urges that he has a constitutional right to a jury more
likely than a death-qualified jury to find him innocent.
Id. (emphasis in original). Since the impartial, nondeath-qualified jury Smith requested was
the equivalent of any jury used in noncapital trials, the Court's admonition of Smith's request
is questionable, at best. See Gross, Determining the Neutrality of Death-Qualified Juries: Judi-
cial Appraisal of Empirical Data, 8 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 7, 13 (1984).
178. 464 U.S. 46 (1983) (per curiam).
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merit in any of the constitutional issues raised. 179 Significant, however, were
the Court's comments regarding Williams' sixth amendment claim that he
was denied a representative jury.'8° On the issue as to whether Williams'
death-qualified jury was less than neutral with respect to guilt, the Court
repeated its position in Witherspoon, finding the evidence too "tentative and
fragmentary" to establish that the jury was conviction-prone.' 8 ' The Court
did not adopt the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit which would have avoided
an evaluation of the evidence while finding no merit whatsoever in the
claim. '
82
The Maggio opinion clearly indicated the Supreme Court's intention' 83
not to foreclose the invitation for proof of conviction-proneness which was
first presented in Witherspoon. 184 Consistent with this rationale, the United
States District Court for the Western District of North Carolina in Keeten v.
Garrison'8 5 reviewed an extensive evidentiary record186 and found that the
death-qualified jury which convicted Keeten of murder was unconstitutional
because it did not represent the community and because it failed to meet the
impartiality requirement of the sixth amendment.' 8 7 The court found that
the sociological studies demonstrating that death-qualified jurors are pro-
prosecution in their attitudes and beliefs also demonstrate that these atti-
tudes translate into pro-prosecution behavior. 18  Since such behavior unnec-
essarily skews jury verdicts against the accused, the court found sufficient
179. Maggio, 464 U.S. at 50.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See Smith v. Balkcom, .660 F.2d at 578 n.12. Cf Maggio, 464 U.S. at 64 n.7 (Bren-
nan, J., dissenting):
The Court has previously noted that, "[in light of ... presently available informa-
tion," it cannot be said that such juror exclusion results in an unrepresentative jury
on the issue of guilt.... That conclusion ... was reached 15 years ago, and recent
cases and scholarship suggest that it may need to be reexamined.... An evidentiary
hearing on this issue is clearly necessary.
Id. (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-18) (citation omitted). See Woodard v. Hutchins,
464 U.S. 377, 380 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., with whom O'Connor, J., joined concurring): "But
assuming that the merits of the Witherspoon aspect ... are necessarily before us, we find that
nothing in the material presented by respondent would show that the particular jurors who sat
in his case were 'less than neutral with respect to guilt.' " Id. (quoting Witherspoon, 391 U.S.
at 520 n. 18) (emphasis in original).
183. See Knighton v. Maggio, 468 U.S. 1229, 1229-30 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
184. 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (discussed supra note 22 and accompanying text).
185. 578 F. Supp. 1164 (W.D.N.C. 1984), rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984).
186. The studies presented as evidence of the conviction-proneness of death-qualified juries
were the same studies which led the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Grigsby to find
the constitutional violations addressed in McCree (discussed supra notes 24, 26 and accompa-
nying text).
187. Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1185.
188. Id. "[Plersons who are willing to impose the death penalty not only share a set of
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justification to invalidate the state's use of death-qualified juries during the
guilt phase of capital trials.189
The Fourth Circuit reversed this decision, adopting the reasoning of the
Fifth Circuit from Spinkellink and Smith. 190 Dismissing the conviction-
proneness studies as irrelevant, the court contended that a request for a
nondeath-qualified jury was, in effect, a request for a jury more likely to find
innocence' 91 than a death-qualified jury.' 92 Since a defendant has a consti-
tutional right only to an impartial jury, the court reasoned that the removal
of Witherspoon-excludables did not violate any constitutional require-
ments. 193 The court ignored the premise central to Witherspoon which
demonstrated that nondeath- qualified juries are, in effect, identical to typical
noncapital juries. Such juries have always been considered fair and impar-
tial.' 94 The defendant's request, then, was for a jury no more acquittal-
prone than the typical, presumptively impartial, noncapital jury. By reason-
ing that a request for a nondeath- qualified jury is equivalent to a request for
a jury partial to the defendant, the Fourth Circuit has undermined the prece-
dent which has supported Witherspoon as a constitutional rule since 1968.'9'
attitudes that are more favorable to the prosecution, but also are predictably more likely to
decide in a manner that favors the prosecution." Id. (emphasis added).
189. Id.
190. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 130.
191. See Winick, Prosecutional Peremptory Challenge Practices in Capital Cases.- An Em-
pirical Study and a Constitutional Analysis, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1, 59 n.199 (1982).
Underlying the [Court's] ... concerns may be the suspicion that 'automatic life im-
prisonment' jurors may really be 'automatic acquittal' jurors, although they swear at
voir dire that they are not. However, any such suspicion could not alone justify the
exclusion of these jurors consistent with the explicit holding of Witherspoon and Ad-
ams ....
Id. (discussed supra note 16-groups 5 and 6).
192. Keeten, 742 F.2d at 134.
193. Id. Cf. Winick, supra note 191, at 59-60. Addressing the reasoning used in the Fifth
Circuit cases and in Keeten, Professor Winick asserts:
This conclusion appears inconsistent with Witherspoon's central holding that exclu-
sion of 'oppose death penalty' jurors results in an unconstitutionally death prone
jury. As applied to Witherspoon's facts, the Fifth Circuit approach would presuma-
bly call for affirmance of Witherspoon's death sentence on the basis that juries includ-
ing 'oppose death penalty' jurors are more life imprisonment-prone than death-
qualified juries, and therefore biased in favor of the defendant. But Witherspoon ex-
plicitly rejected this contention in favor of a jury that the Court deemed more impar-
tial than one which excludes all death penalty objectors. Witherspoon thus suggests
that if a capital jury resembling the jury that sits in the typical noncapital case-
universally regarded as fair and impartial-is found to be significantly less convic-
tion-prone than a death-qualified jury, then the latter would be constitutionally sus-
pect as a trier of the defendant's guilt.
Id. (footnote omitted).
194. See generally Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-17.
195. Winick, supra note 191, at 59-60.
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C. The Retroactivity Issue
In 1985, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in
Grigsby v. Mabry 196 reviewed the conviction-proneness evidence197 and cre-
ated controversy among the circuits by holding that death-qualified juries
are unconstitutionally partial on the question of guilt or innocence.' 98 In the
wake of Grigsby, Woodard v. Sargent199 presented the Eighth Circuit with
the claim that the Grigsby decision should be applied retroactively to invali-
date prior convictions issued by death-qualified juries.2" Paralleling those
principles first announced in Witherspoon,2o' the court identified the purpose
of Grigsby as insuring the reliability of jury verdicts, and held that the Grig-
sby rule must be applied retroactively.2 °2 The court reasoned that such ret-
roactive application was necessary regardless of the effect it would have on
existing convictions in capital cases. 20 3 The court added that a full retroac-
tive effect is mandated in cases such as these where the constitutional accu-
racy of criminal trials is at issue.2° '
As these cases illustrate, jury impartiality has always been a goal of our
judicial system.20 5 To preserve this ideal, the Witherspoon Court examined
the concept of the neutral jury and speculated that one- day evidence would
be presented to substantiate the claim that death-qualified juries are less
than neutral with respect to guilt.206 The evidence which was considered
"tentative" in Witherspoon, today conclusively documents the conviction-
proneness of death-qualified juries.20 7 The courts have interpreted this evi-
dence in a variety of ways, 20 and at least one court has held that such a
conviction-prone jury violates the Constitution's impartiality require-
196. 758 F.2d 226 (8th Cir. 1985).
197. See supra notes 24, 26, 43-44 and accompanying text.
198. Grigsby, 758 F.2d at 229.
199. 753 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1985).
200. Id. at 695. Billy Woodard was tried before a death-qualified jury as specified in
Witherspoon. The jury convicted Woodard of capital felony murder and sentenced him to
death.
201. 391 U.S. at 523 n.22 (discussed supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text).
202. Woodard, 753 F.2d at 697.
203. Id. at 696.
204. Id. at 697. See generally White, supra note 73, at 1205-20.
205. E.g., Hayes, 120 U.S. at 70 (discussed supra notes 144-47 and accompanying text).
206. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18 (discussed supra notes 155-58 and accompanying
text).
207. E.g., Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1185 (discussed supra notes 185-89 and accompanying
text). See McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1764.
208. Compare Clark, 538 F.2d at 750 (discussed supra notes 159-63 and accompanying
text) with Maggio, 464 U.S. at 46 (discussed supra notes 178-84 and accompanying text).
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ment.2°9 The resulting controversy is addressed by the Supreme Court in
McCree. 
2 10
III. LOCKHART V MCCREE: CONVICTION-PRONENESS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEATH-QUALIFIED JURIES
A. The Removal of Witherspoon-Excludables Does Not Violate the
Representative Cross Section Requirement of
the Sixth Amendment
Historically, the Court has depicted the representative jury as a group of
individuals possessing the collective values211 and common sense of the com-
munity. 212 The intentional exclusion of any group of persons possessing
unique qualities and perspectives has been held to undermine the idea of the
impartial jury which interjects community common sense into the adver-
sarial arena of the courtroom.21 3 In McCree,21 4 the Court granted the state
an exception 215 to these long preserved values by finding that the Constitu-
tion does not prohibit a procedure which has the effect of intentionally elimi-
nating from panels an entire subset of fair and impartial guilt phase jurors
because they interfere with the state's interest in using jurors willing to con-
sider the death penalty during the second phase of bifurcated capital
trials.216
The Court justified this decision by adjudging Witherspoon-excludables an
"indistinct ' 21 7 group under the prima facie requirements of Duren.2 18
While acknowledging that no definition of the term "distinct" has ever been
formulated, and admitting that no definition would be forthcoming, the
Court nevertheless utilized the nebulous nature of this requirement as the
basis for its entire cross-sectional analysis.21 9
The Court emphasized that distinctiveness has been deemed applicable
209. See Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1185 (discussed supra notes 185-89 and accompanying
text).
210. 106 S. Ct. at 1762-64.
211. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. at 130 (discussed supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text);
Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text).
212. Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232 (discussed supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text).
213. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text).
214. 106 S. Ct. at 1758.
215. Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1282 ("death qualification is the only procedure in our crimi-
nal justice system which has the effect of systematically excluding an entire group of fair and
impartial jurors because of a particular attitude that they possess upon a matter that is irrele-
vant to their service as jurors in the trial of the issue of guilt or innocence of the accused.").
216. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1759-60.
217. Id. at 1766.
218. 439 U.S. at 364 (discussed supra notes 98-103 and accompanying text).
219. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1765.
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only to groups such as blacks22 ° and women2 2 1 whose immutable character-
istics were once the basis for discriminatory exclusion.22 2 Precedent pro-
vides a sound basis for the Court's hesitancy to extend cross-sectional
requirements to groups other than racial minorities and women.22 3 How-
ever, an examination of the Court's rationale in these cases reveals that it is
the excluded group's perspectives and qualities that are essential to a proper
jury, not the immutable characteristic that gave rise to discrimination.22 4
This rationale provides that basis for a fair conclusion that Witherspoon-
excludables are a distinct group in the community.
2 25
Common within each group deemed cognizable by the Court are shared
attitudes and perspectives that are necessary to a representative jury. 226 An
examination of excluded jurors in capital cases reveals that their restriction
from jury service is based on a shared belief that the death penalty is never
an appropriate punishment for any convicted criminal.2 27 Social science
studies have shown that, corresponding to this shared belief about capital
punishment, these excluded jurors possess distinct views about the criminal
justice system and about society's role in the deterrence of heinous crimes.228
Although the McCree majority disagrees, it should be noted that this ex-
cluded set of jurors would inject extremely relevant views into guilt phase
deliberations and should therefore be included on these jury panels. 2 2 9
The decision of the McCree majority not to extend cross section require-
ments to scrupled guilt phase jurors is inconsistent with the basic premise
that has established Witherspoon as a universally accepted constitutional
measure.230 The decision to limit permissible juror exclusions in Wither-
spoon reflects the Court's desire to impose the least intrusive means to ac-
commodate the state's interest in obtaining juries capable of implementing
their capital punishment statutes.231' The courts have consistently inter-
220. E.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text).
221. E.g., Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (discussed supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text);
Duren, 439 U.S. at 367 (discussed supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text).
222. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
223. But see Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (discussed supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text).
224. E.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text);
Thiel, 328 U.S. at 220 (discussed supra notes 77-83 and accompanying text); Witherspoon, 391
U.S. at 519-20 (discussed supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text).
225. See, e.g., Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1284-85.
226. E.g., Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text);
Taylor, 419 U.S. at 538 (discussed supra notes 84-90 and accompanying text).
227. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
228. See generally supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
229. See Winick, supra note 191, at 70-73.
230. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 519-20 (discussed supra notes 66-73 and accompanying text).
231. Id. See Winick, supra note 191, at 56-59.
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preted this to mean that a broader than necessary exclusion of jurors in-
trudes on a defendant's acknowledged interest in a representative jury.232
This rationale should be extended to McCree's guilt phase jury, thereby
prohibiting the unnecessary exclusion of guilt phase includable jurors who
could fairly and impartially determine guilt.
233
As the framers of the Constitution intended, accused individuals should
receive the fairest trial before a jury which is most representative of the com-
munity.2 34 To guarantee that this valued ideal is advanced, the Court must
protect each individual's interest in a representative jury by guaranteeing
that the conscience of the community is reflected in jury venires.23 5 The
McCree majority, by refusing to acknowledge the distinctiveness of Wither-
spoon-excludables, has allowed the state to continue its practice of economiz-
ing while compromising a defendant's interest in a truly representative guilt
phase jury. 23 6 This decision, in effect, gives the state full discretion to inten-
tionally and systematically exclude from the guilt phase of capital trials at
least eleven to seventeen percent 23 7 of all fair and impartial jurors.23 8
B. The Impartiality of Death-Qualified Juries
Emerging from the Witherspoon succession of case law are two distinct
approaches to the implications of the conviction-proneness evidence and the
definition of an impartial jury.239 Under the more traditional approach,
which echoes the rationale that established Witherspoon as a stronghold in
our scheme of justice,2 ° the exclusion of a group of jurors that is less likely
than the general population to vote for conviction violates the Constitu-
tion.24 1 In stark contrast to these principles, the approach advanced by the
Fourth and Fifth Circuits242 finds no constitutional violation in the use of
232. Adams, 448 U.S. at 50-51 (discussed supra notes 106-15 and accompanying text).
233. See generally supra note 16.
234. Peters, 407 U.S. at 503-04 (discussed supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text).
235. See Ballew, 435 U.S. at 232-39 (discussed supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text).
236. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1766.
237. See supra note 130; see also Grigsby, 569 F. Supp. at 1294; McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1772
& n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
238. The group of jurors referred to here are guilt phase includables. Sitting only during
the guilt phase of a trial, these jurors would impartially determine the facts of a given case and
apply the law. Because Arkansas utilized a unitary, bifurcated jury process, guilt phase includ-
ables are excluded simply because they will not vote to impose the death penalty during the
sentencing phase of the bifurcated trial. See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text.
239. Compare Smith. 660 F.2d at 573 (discussed supra notes 168-77 and accompanying
text) with Maggio, 464 U.S. at 46 (discussed supra notes 178-82 and accompanying text).
240. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18. See discussion supra note 22.
241. Eg., McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1775-76 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
242. See Keeten, 742 F.2d at 129 (discussed supra notes 190-95 and accompanying text);
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conviction-prone juries.24 3
In McCree, 2" the majority opinion of Justice Rehnquist utilized elements
of both of these approaches to find that the Constitution does not prohibit
the state from death- qualifying jurors. 245 Although the opinion refrained
from directly citing the circuit court decisions, 246 it seemed to parallel those
principles first established in Spinkellink 24' by contending that partiality as a
legal concept is not proven by studies referring to "some hypothetical mix of
individual viewpoints. '248 The Court ignored the evidence which indicates
that a death-qualified jury, composed of individuals with pro-prosecution
attitudes, is more likely to decide against criminal defendants than a typical
jury which sits in all noncapital cases.24 9 Instead, the Court explained that a
jury randomly selected from the community is presumed to be impartial,
regardless of the actual mix of viewpoints represented on the panel. 25" This
rationale was offered absent acknowledgment that the process of death quali-
fication allows the state to systematically exclude that portion of the popula-
tion opposed to capital punishment.251
To fortify this analysis, Justice Rehnquist stepped back into the traditional
Witherspoon mode of judicial review by scrutinizing the conviction-prone-
ness studies and reiterating criticisms of those studies.252 By preserving the
state's use of the death- qualified jury in bifurcated procedures while conced-
ing that the Cowan study253 was methodologically valid and sufficient to
indicate that death qualification produces a jury prone to convict,254 Justice
Rehnquist then indirectly answered the question presented by the Wither-
spoon Court in 1968.25 By interpreting McCree's request for a nondeath-
qualified jury at the guilt phase of his trial as a request for a jury which will
not conscientiously follow the law, Justice Rehnquist, in effect, held that the
state's interest in the use of single juries in a bifurcated trial is vindicated at
Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 582 (discussed supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text); Smith,
660 F.2d at 573 (discussed supra notes 168-77 and accompanying text).
243. E.g., Spinkellink, 578 F.2d at 594 (discussed supra note 166 and accompanying text).
244. 106 S. Ct. at 1758.
245. Id. at 1764.
246. The Fourth Circuit Keeten opinion is cited only in a footnote. See McCree, 106 S. Ct.
at 1762 n.3.
247. 578 F.2d at 594 (discussed supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text).
248. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770.
249. See generally id. at 1764.
250. Id. at 1770.
251. See generally id.
252. Id. at 1762-63.
253. See supra note 24.
254. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1764.
255. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 520 n.18. See supra note 22.
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the expense of the defendant's interest in a completely fair determination of
guilt. 25
6
Justice Marshall's dissent strongly criticized the majority opinion while
heartily advocating the application of a conventional Witherspoon analysis of
the conviction-proneness evidence.25 7 While charging the majority with
misconstruing the constitutional parameters of the impartiality requirement,
Justice Marshall firmly contended that the logic which led the Witherspoon
Court to find the jury partial during the penalty phase determination must
be adopted to McCree's guilt phase jury.258
Addressing the significance of the social science research indicating that
pro-prosecution attitudes of death-qualified jurors translate into impartial
jury deliberations and verdicts, the dissenters advocate using alternate ap-
proaches to the unitary jury bifurcated trial procedure.2 59 Justice Marshall
pointed out that the only justifications that the state advances to preserve the
use of a single jury are savings in court time and financial costs. 2 ° Because
capital cases are relatively infrequent, the dissent indicated that empanelling
two juries for capital cases would not greatly inflate court costs or jeopardize
court efficiency. 26 ' Also, since not all defendants are found guilty, the court
would not have to conduct a death- qualifying voir dire each time a prosecu-
tor requests the death penalty.26 2 This would only be done if guilt is
found.263
Since the implication that death-qualified juries are conviction-prone is
well documented, Justice Marshall observed that this information unneces-
sarily taints the reliability of the guilt determination process. 26 This unreli-
ability is particularly repugnant to the dissenters because it affects accused
individuals who may ultimately face death as their criminal sanction.265 In
such a context, Justice Marshall concluded that financial considerations
should never take priority over an individual's constitutional rights.26 6
Most significant in the McCree majority opinion, is the Court's conclusion
that conviction-proneness does not constitute partiality. For impartiality to
retain some cogent definition as a legal concept, however, it must be affected
256. See generally McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1770.
257. Id. at 1775 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
258. Id. See supra notes 16-22 and accompanying text.
259. McCree, 106 S. Ct. at 1781 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
260. Id.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 1782.
265. See id.
266. See generally id. at 1780-82.
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by evidence that a jury is predisposed to rule in favor of one party. This
notion is especially relevant when considering the compelling evidence dem-
onstrating that the predisposition of death-qualified juries to vote in favor of
conviction causes skewed jury verdicts which give the state a statistically
significant advantage over accused individuals.2 67  From the evidence
presented, it seems apparent that by ordering an accused individual to pres-
ent his case to a jury which is more likely to convict him than a jury ran-
domly drawn from the community, the Court has disregarded the
fundamental requirement that all defendants, even capital defendants, are
guaranteed a trial before an impartial jury.2 68
To justify overlooking the implications of the conviction-proneness claim,
the Court unnecessarily focused on the state's interest in conserving time
and money. Obviously, some additional costs would be incurred if the states
were ordered to modify the present capital procedure and impose a new con-
stitutional rule retroactively. 269 However, it seems that these additional
costs should be irrelevant in a society that values the essential fairness of its
system of justice. The continued use of single juries in bifurcated capital
trials lessens the reliability of guilt determinations and gives the prosecution
an unprecedented advantage over accused individuals. Although McCree, in
effect, forecloses the invitation for additional conviction-proneness evidence,
a procedure such as death qualification should be discontinued until all sides
agree that definitive proof of the impartiality of capital juries has been
presented.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Lockhart v. McCree, the Supreme Court concluded that the use of
death- qualified juries during the guilt phase of bifurcated trials does not of-
fend the constitutional requirements of an impartial jury, drawn from a fair
cross section of the community. Witherspoon-excludables, distinguishable by
their shared attitudes and beliefs, were not found to be a sufficiently distinct
group in the community to warrant cross-sectional representation. Addi-
tionally, studies have found that the exclusion of these jurors results in a jury
which favors the prosecution in its attitudes and conclusions. In deeming
this predisposition constitutional, the Court in McCree reasoned that convic-
tion-proneness is not sufficiently indicative of partiality to support the impo-
sition of a per se constitutional rule.
267. See supra note 26.
268. See, e.g., Keeten, 578 F. Supp. at 1164, rev'd, 742 F.2d 129 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 106 S. Ct. 2258 (1986). See supra notes 185-89 and accompanying text.
269. See Woodard, 753 F.2d at 697 (discussed supra notes 199-204 and accompanying
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By refusing to find these claims unconstitutional the Court has fashioned a
fragmented judicial analysis that preserves the state's interest in using single
juries in bifurcated procedures. The decision also allows the states to avoid
the prospect of a retroactive imposition of the Grigsby rule that would invali-
date all prior convictions issued by death-qualified juries. McCree then,
represents an uncommon situation where the Court allows financial consid-
erations to outweigh an individual's fundamental constitutional right to an
impartial and representative jury.
Jane Byrne
